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Monday, Dec. 10, 1945

PEARL HARBOR: They Called It Intelligence

The Pearl Harbor Committee turned from diplomatic to military witnesses. Two
facts were quickly established: 1) the Japs—sometimes through carelessness,
sometimes through code messages—gave the U.S. much more advance notice of the
Pearl Harbor attack than has been generally realized; 2) thanks to stupidity in
Washington and in the field, the U.S. took the least possible advantage of the
warnings.

To the stand went balding, bumbling Major General Sherman Miles, wearer of
four rows of ribbons, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence in the
crucial days of 1941. Into the record went a long series of Japanese code
messages intercepted before Dec. 7. Most significant: instructions sent by Tokyo
on Sept. 24, ordering a spy in Honolulu to divide Pearl Harbor into five
sectors, report on the ships at anchor in each.

Asked a committee counsel: "Isn't that type of message of a special
significance?"

Answered onetime G-2 Miles: "The message . . . was not taken alone. It was
one of a number ... to all points of the world, to follow the movement of our
vessels."

Q. It looks like a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor?

A. That's exactly what it looks like, now that we know Pearl Harbor was
bombed.

Q. Wasn't this message quite different from the others? . . . Have you found
any others like this?

A. I have not found any similar.

Q. One of the functions of a properly functioning G-2 would have been to
single this out and attempt to evaluate its significance, wouldn't it?

A. Yes, sir. But we did not see the significance at that time that we now see
in the light of subsequent events.

Opportunity Keeps Knocking. On Nov. 15, the Jap spy was instructed to send
reports twice a week on ships in Pearl Harbor; on Nov. 29 he was asked for Pearl
Harbor reports "even when there are no movements." Both messages were decoded
well in advance of the attack. General Miles conceded that they gave "added
significance to the first message." But Intelligence paid no particular heed,
said nothing about them to Lieut. General Walter C. Short, the Army commander in
Hawaii.

Other intercepted messages, sent between Nov. 24 and Dec. 6, were even more
revealing. Tokyo was asking for detailed information on ship movements and
schedules, for any reports of barrage balloons over the harbor. The Honolulu spy
was reporting that there appeared to be no aerial reconnaissance, that
"opportunity is still left for a surprise attack."

But these messages were not decoded in time. The Signal Corps's "Magic"
project, which held the secret of the Jap code, was short of men and facilities.
General Miles "assured" himself that the work was being done as fast as possible
under the circumstances, decided that there his responsibility ended.

Other facts disclosed by Miles:

¶ Jap messages decoded by "Magic" were seen by only a few top brass hats,
were not always shown to the President, were not sent to commanders in the field
at all. (The Army & Navy were afraid the Japs might learn their secret.)

¶ Neither Army nor Navy Intelligence placed any credence in a report from
Tokyo by Ambassador Grew, in January 1941, that the Peruvian Minister had
learned "from many sources, including a Japanese source" that the Japs planned
to open the war with a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. (Intelligence officers
somehow figured out that no Jap in a position to know would be so stupid as to
say.)

¶ The Navy high command warned Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on Dec. 3 that Jap
diplomats and consuls all over the world were destroying their papers and codes.
General Miles did not ask the Navy to pass this message along to General Short
at Honolulu. Said he: "That was not considered necessary. ... I believed that
the Navy messages were being transmitted to the Army in Hawaii and vice
versa."

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